

BACK TO, FORWARD FROM, AHAD HAAM?

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IN THE early years of the century there appeared a remarkable book, by the Italian Croce, entitled: *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel?* The subject on which I wish you to direct your attention today is: What is living, and what is dead, in Ahad HaAm?

By 'living,' I mean what is living *for us*, by 'dead,' what is dead *for us*. In the recently published volume *Tradition and Change* on the development of the Conservative movement in the Jewry of the United States, there is excerpted an address by the present Vice-Chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in which the first of the 'four tested standards' of the movement is declared to be: Scientific knowledge of the whole of Judaism. The aim is ambitious and I hope the Seminary lives up to it. But even after the 'whole of' Judaism has become known *scientifically*, there still remains the task of its evaluation. Evaluation is not the business of science. Science describes; it does not judge. But life means judgment, discrimination, selection. *On doit choisir*. There are subjects and opinions which for us today are more significant than others and it is these which we have to look out for. What then can we find today of significance in Ahad HaAm, and, having found it, how and where do we go on further?

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It should be said at once that we are all of us, in some sense and in some degree, disciples of Ahad HaAm. We all use his ideas, all speak his language. They are current coin, passed from hand to hand, without thought of the mint in which they were struck. And if we turn again to his writings, we can see the secret of his appeal. Here is a man, we say to ourselves, who talks sense; and he talks sense sensibly. He knows where to begin, and when to stop. His prose is prose, not pastiche. He displays a breadth of vision, a width of interest, a substratum of seminal ideas, which we miss in some other modern Hebrew writers. He is worthy of all admiration; but—and here is my first point—let us admire him for what he *is*, not for what he is *not*. You may have observed that the question I set at the head of this paper was not: What is living and what is dead in the *philosophy* of Ahad HaAm, but What is living and what is dead in Ahad HaAm. Ahad HaAm, as I shall explain, was no philosopher and had no philosophy of his own. He was rather, much after the English model, a philosophically-minded essayist.

It is not an insult to a man to say he is not a philosopher. There have been very few philosophers in this world, of great ones, say a dozen, of lesser, say a

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score. Add the ordinary laborers in that particular vineyard of the Lord and you might count, all told, a hundred. Giving us Jews our proper percentage—one, two, three, four five? Surely five per cent is enough even for us!—you will see that we have better candidates than Ahad HaAm. But it is a question whether he is to be counted even as a candidate. To be able to hold together in his thought—as Plato put it—‘all time and all existence’—that is traditionally what it means to be a philosopher. Such a claim cannot be made for Ahad HaAm, and Ahad HaAm himself would never have dreamed of making it. Ahad HaAm saw himself as a ‘publicist,’ that is, an occasional writer on current issues. And so he was in fact. He was a singularly clear-minded and keen-witted man, widely read (particularly in the field of what is now called that of the social sciences), passionately interested in certain aspects of the Jewish problem as manifested in his day, who used ideas derived from his reading—his past and present reading—in order to illumine the questions of the day. His interest was *not* in ‘all time and all existence’ but in a *particular* time and *one slice* of existence. He was emphatically and confessedly a child of his age and environment; and ages and environments change.

This became clear even in his own life. He was never a genuine part of the new Yishuv. Even in Hampstead he wrote something. In Tel Aviv, like Bialik, he wrote nothing. Inspiration ceased. He belonged to Odessa, he belonged to Berlin, he belonged to the City. He may have hated them all, but it was with a hatred which served as a stimulus. He may have *loved* Tel Aviv; but he was only *in* it, not *of* it.

This fact has come out clearly in one of the most revealing episodes in the cultural history of the new State. There is a revolt against Ahad HaAm. The ‘young men,’ whether ‘angry’ or placid, will have nothing to do with him. Some of you may have seen the controversy in the literary pages of Israeli newspapers a few years ago, and in particular the articles of Gideon Katznelson and others of the younger novelists. Their judgment is not due *only* to the fact that they had been made to read Ahad HaAm in school: that is a reason for boredom, not rejection. They rejected him root and branch; and even the recent symposium at Hillel House in Jerusalem produced from the professors and lecturers of the University an appreciation which, when not openly condemnatory, was cold. If you wish today to find disciples of Ahad HaAm, you have to go to America.

But they admire him there *for the wrong things*. They treat him as an original and creative thinker who forged new ideas valid for all time. But Ahad HaAm was never, and never set himself up as, that. He was, as I have said, a philosophically-minded essayist who used current ideas in order to help himself and others to see their way through present fact. If you isolate those ideas and treat them as self-subsistent and eternal verities, you are doing Ahad HaAm a grave injustice. Ahad HaAm was a writer and an excellent writer. But few writers, however excellent, particularly a casual and incidental writer as he confessedly

was, can stand the process of deification. You might as well expect to extract a perennial metaphysic from the leading articles of the Times!

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Ahad HaAm was not only a leader-writer and an excellent one at that. He was also a man of singular courage. He tried to live up to his own professions. When he said that Judaism was more important than Jews, he meant it. When certain facts first appeared in the Yishuv—facts then only the size of a man's hand—he spoke up, and vigorously. I am going to read to you the text of a once famous public letter. I say 'once famous' because it is now unnoticed and unremarked. It does not appear, so far as I know, in any of the many translations of his works, nor, so far as I was able to observe, is it mentioned in the recent Simon-Heller *Life*. But it is all-important for Ahad HaAm's memory. Without it his life is a fraud. For his life which was his work meant sincerity of feeling and cool acceptance of fact coupled with complete honesty of judgment and expression.

The occasion for this letter was the report in the early autumn of 1922 that in retaliation for attacks on Jews, some young Jews had killed an Arab boy. On this, Ahad HaAm published the following letter in the *HaAretz*. It was reprinted in *HaAretz* itself some time in the late thirties and is to be found on page 462 of the one-volume edition of Ahad HaAm's collected works published by Dvir in 1946. It reads as follows (I have translated literally, hence the halting language):

From the time when I first heard the story which is the subject of your article and in particular as I see the reaction of the community in the country to the affair, my heart is filled with gloomy thoughts and I feel as if there were tottering within me all the foundations upon which I built my views on Judaism and Zionism from my youth up. And if these go, what is there left to me in my old age of all the labor which I have labored in my life except an empty heart and a soul in despair.

"Jews and blood—are there two opposites greater than these?" It was with these words that I concluded one of my first essays many, many years ago; and I was confident at that time that this was a first principle of the truth of which no Jew could doubt. For what did we save from the the overthrow of the Destruction but the teaching of our prophets, which we took with us on the road of the long exile to illumine for us the darkness of our lives on strange soil? Our blood was shed like water in all the four corners of the earth for thousands of years, but *we* did not shed blood. We remembered always that the great moral teaching which our fathers handed down to us is the doctrine of the future which it is our duty to preserve, and to give up our lives for, until it become the possession of all humankind, and the beast which is in man cease to rule individual and social existence. Thus our people lived generation after generation. It lived in strange countries among nations who lived on their sword, and the shedding of blood was the work of their hands all the days. But *our* people,

persecuted everywhere, for all its external degradation, looked with disgust on its neighbors with their hands polluted with blood, and knew in the depths of its heart that it had, and never would have, any connection with that life of savagery; because it was the depository of the great moral truth which is destined to spread over the whole world and put an end to the savagery, the cruelty, the spilling of blood, all over the world. And then it too would live in security in its own land and would see with its own eyes its great victory, the victory of its moral teaching for which it had been slaughtered for thousands of years . . .

And now, what can we say and how can we speak if there is truth in this report? God, is this the End? Is this the goal for which our forefathers yearned and for which they suffered all those tribulations? Is this the dream of the Return to Zion which our people dreamed for thousands of years: that we should come to Zion and pollute its soil with the spilling of innocent blood?

I concluded another article, also many years ago, with the words: "The people will give its money as a price for the state, but not its prophets." I thought that that too was a first principle. And now God hath dealt hardly with me and given to me to live and see with my own eyes that I was mistaken, apparently, in this as well. Money? The people is not giving much money even now for the building of its "national home," in spite of the Mandate and the rest of the "political victories." But correspondingly there is growing in it a tendency to sacrifice, on the altar of the "revival," its prophets, that is, the great moral principles for which our people lived and for which it suffered and for which only it thought it worthwhile to labor to become a people again in the land of its fathers. For without these—God in Heaven, what are we, and what is the future of our life in this country, that we should make all those unending sacrifices without which the country will not be built? Is it only in order to add another little Levantine people in one of the corners of the Orient to compete with the Levantines there already in all those corrupt moral habits—the thirst for blood, revenge and strife—which make up the content of their lives?

If this is the Messiah, let him come and me not see him.

"Let him come and me not see him." The phrase is Talmudic and is the recorded comment of some well-known sages on the troubles supposed to prelude the coming of the Messiah. In its context the reference is to material troubles, the so-called "birth-pangs" of the Messianic age. Ahad HaAm, in his use of the words, refers to another kind of trouble, the spiritual troubles of moral anarchy. Ultimately his protest is against the attitude expressed in the phrase "the end justifies the means" which I should translate into Hebrew as *Mitzvah habaah be'aveirah* ("a religious act achieved through a wrong deed"—Jastrow), a phrase used by a modern Jerusalem scholar as a title for an essay describing the premises, and the consequences, of the xviii century Messianic movement in Jewry. There is an old warning against losing the reasons for life for the sake of living. There are some prices which are too high to pay; and Ahad HaAm seems to have felt it, as this letter shows, with every fiber of his being. The times were for him clearly out of joint.

But we may leave Ahad HaAm the man and turn to some of his pronouncements on the theory of Judaism. We may start with his account of Jewish ethics. You will remember that he identified the ethics of Judaism with the demand for absolute justice, in contrast with the ethics of Christianity as understood by him, the ethics of love; and he saw the contrast as manifested and exemplified in the negative and positive interpretations of "loving thy neighbour as thyself" expressed in the well-known sayings of Hillel and Jesus.

The essays in which these views are given have become classic, and we have all used them time and time again. The contrast between justice and love is so attractive, the opposition between the golden rules of Hillel and Jesus so neat. But one day I came across the following in a reputable Jewish author:

It is laid down by the Rabbis *as a positive command* to visit the sick and to comfort mourners and to take out the dead and to help a bride and to escort travellers and to occupy ourselves with everything requisite for a burial; and similarly to make the bride and bridegroom rejoice and to help them in all their needs. These are the personal acts of charity (*Gemillut Hasadim*) which have no measure.

But although all these commands are Rabbinical, they are included in "And thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself": all the things which you wish others to do to you, do you them to your fellow.

This passage (*Yad, Avel* xiv, i) seems pretty definite. The love of neighbor (the *love* of neighbor!) is a general principle of *positive* action. So Maimonides, at least, is far from interpreting the Biblical principle, with Hillel, negatively. Indeed, in another passage (*Commentary, Peah* i) he seems to interpret Hillel's *negative* formulation *positively*:

All the commandments between man and man are included in *Gemillut Hasadim*, and if you give your attention to them, you will find them so; since Hillel, when the gentile said to him, Teach me Judaism on one foot, replied, What is unpleasant to you, do not do to your fellow.

I may be misinterpreting him but Maimonides seems to be putting the whole of morals, so far as our positive actions affecting others are concerned, under the rubric of *Gemillut Hasadim*, and the whole of *Gemillut Hasadim*, as a *positive system of behavior*, under the rubric of Hillel's so-called *negative* formulation of the golden rule.

Now I am not for one moment saying that Maimonides is right and Ahad HaAm wrong, or that Ahad HaAm is right and Maimonides wrong, or that either of them is either right or wrong *because* the other is wrong or right. But I suggest that any general statement on the nature of Jewish ethics which runs *counter* to an equally general, and certainly deliberate, ruling of Maimonides cannot be accepted without further examination, without *much* further examination. The very existence of Maimonides' opinion should make us pause in swallowing Ahad HaAm's (as we have all swallowed it) whole.

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The same seems to me to hold of Ahad HaAm's no less famous opposition between justice and love. You may remember the appearance of the essay in which it is expounded. Unless my memory deceives me, it was published in English simultaneously with its appearance in Hebrew, in the *Hebrew Review* of Bentwich and Sacher. It created a sensation. It seemed to be a new revelation, or at least, to solve finally a problem which had beset Jewry for many centuries. The occasion for the essay was important. The community had been uneasy about the views and activities of one of its most gifted members, the late Claude Montefiore; and here, it was thought, was a decisive answer to them. But is it?

I have already pointed out that if the iron curtain is to be set in accordance with Ahad HaAm's view of the golden rule and the contrast regarding it between Judaism and Christianity, no less a person than Maimonides would be found to be on the wrong side. The same, I fancy, would happen with regard to justice and love; for whoever looks with any attention at the last chapters of the *Guide for the Perplexed* knows that, according to Maimonides, the central virtue of Judaism is not justice unalloyed, if indeed justice at all, but justice *plus* both *Hesed* and *Tzedakah*. Maimonides takes (it will be remembered) the great key pronouncement of Jeremiah is, 23-4, and proceeds to analyze its terms. *Mishpat* (justice) gets only two lines; *Hesed* ('steadfast love,' as it is translated in the new Revised Standard Version) and *Tzedakah* (which he interprets as equity, the mildness and extenuation *correcting* the severities of justice), a full discussion. I shall not weary you with detail but on the mere words themselves (and *a fortiori* on their Biblical usage) Ahad HaAm's distinction is astonishingly shaky. If his basic view were sound, the Torah should not have said, Righteousness, righteousness, thou shalt pursue (*Tzedek tzedek tirdof*), but *Mishpat, mishpat tirdof*; which it does *not*. As for the 'absolute' (*muhlat*) of Ahad HaAm, it is of course a neologism for the German 'absolut' borrowed from the usage of Nahman Krochmal. I shall have something to say about Ahad HaAm and Krochmal later, but I must now say a bit more about *Tzedek* and *Mishpat*.

You will remember that the Psalmist (lxxxix, 15) says: Righteousness and judgment are the foundation of thy throne; mercy and truth go before thy face. The parallelism is clearly that of *Tzedek* with *Hesed* and *Mishpat* with *Emet*. *Tzedek* is thus next door to love and on the other side of the street to the rigorous pair of justice and truth. In Rabbinical phrase, the attribute of sheer law needs the counterbalance of the attribute of mercy. *Tzedek* is generally translated by righteousness. I am not sure myself what the English word means. But whatever righteousness may mean, I think that Rabbinic tradition is one with Maimonides in suggesting that the meaning of *Tzedek* is 'equitableness' or 'fairness.'

For example:

Our teachers laid it down: "In righteousness shalt thou judge thy

neighbor': one litigant should not be allowed to sit while the other stands, one speak his full and the other told to cut his words short.

Another lesson: 'In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor: judge your neighbor with an inclination in his favor. R. Joseph taught: 'In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor': do your best to judge him 'yapheh.'

I shall not press this last of R. Joseph, though if the reference is to absolute justice, its terms ('do your best to'; 'yapheh') seem inappropriate. But both the first and second glosses call for comment, especially the second. Absolute justice has nothing to do with an inclination in a man's favor. Rashi explains it to refer not to court cases where there are two litigants but to instances of private behavior where different interpretations are possible, and to mean that in suspicious circumstances you should give other people the benefit of the doubt. But giving a person the benefit of the doubt has nothing to do with absolute justice. It is rather general decency or, as I said earlier, fairness. It is treating him—positively!—as we would like to be treated ourselves!

The point is that, as the Midrash insists so often, 'pure' justice is impracticable. God, in the famous words, cannot hold 'both sides of the rope at once.' If he wants a world at all, he must rule it with mercy, not justice. Or, speaking of man (*Tos. San.* 1):

'Truth and judgment of peace judge in your gates': surely wherever there is judgment of truth, there is no peace, and wherever there is peace, there is no judgment of truth. Where can you have judgment and peace together? Only where there is compromise (*betzua*). Similarly we read: 'And David did justice and righteousness (*Tzedakah*) for all his people.' Surely wherever there is justice there is no righteousness, and wherever there is righteousness there is no justice. What justice is there in which there is righteousness? Where there is compromise.

Here again, *Tzedek* or *Tzedekah* is the mitigating virtue which makes justice possible. Justice alone will not work, *cannot* work. May I remind you of those striking passages in which the destruction of Jerusalem is attributed to its affairs having been conducted strictly on the 'Din' of the Torah. Whatever they may mean (and there have been various attempts to explain them), there does seem a clear suggestion that 'Din' by itself needs qualification. Is not the special virtue emphasized for Jewry in Rabbinical writings that of action 'within the boundary fixed by Din.'

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One may reach the same result from many other sides. For example, there is the famous remark about the three distinguishing qualities of Jewry (*B. Yeb.* 79a):

There are three signs in this people: they are compassionate; they are modest; they are charitable.

The last quality is supported by the verse about Abraham being called in order that he should command his children and his household after him that

they may keep the way of the Lord, *to do justice and judgment* (Gen. xviii, 19), as the English has it for the Hebrew *Mishpat utzedakah*. Here the Rabbis seem to have missed a wonderful opportunity. If their view had been that of Ahad HaAm, they would have said that the third distinguishing mark of Jewry, and the original and indispensable one enshrined in its first charter, is its passion for justice; and they would have pointed out that the text ignores all else and concentrates on the synonyms *Mishpat* and *Tzedakah* in order to emphasize the absoluteness or the justice required. They seem however to have done precisely the opposite. They blandly overlook the presence of the word *Mishpat* and lay all the stress on *Tzedakah*, interpreting *Tzedakah* as blandly not in the possible sense of something of the nature of justice but on the contrary in the popular sense of charity and good works (cf. too *Ket.* 8b). *Tzedakah* clearly interests the Rabbis more than *Mishpat*. Anyone (they seem to say) can be just. It takes a Jew to be kind. This remark, by the way, is not mine. It is from my usual source which is itself derived from his usual sources. 'The seed of Abraham our father,' says Maimonides, 'feel compassion for all. If anyone does not, you may suspect his ancestry.'

Of course, Maimonides was a 'rationalist' (a recent, and regrettable, term of abuse among Jews); so, at the risk of wearying you, I quote the (*ex definitione*) unimpeachable testimony of a 'mystic':

"The terms *Tzedakah* and *Hesed* used in the verse (Proverbs xiv, 34) are the twins mentioned together everywhere, as for example, 'He pursues *Tzedakah* and *Hesed*' and, 'I am the Lord who doeth *Hesed*, *Mishpat* and *Tzedakah* on the earth.' The plain sense of the verse is in my opinion that *Tzedakah* exalteth a nation when it is present. *Hesed* is a reproach to any people when it is absent. The meaning is thus that it is in *Tzedakah* and *Hesed* that the exaltation of any nation lies. Their lack is its reproach." (Nahmanides on Lev. xx, 17)

We may compare the insistence of another 'anti-rationalist,' Samuel David Luzatto, on pity (*Hemlah*) as the root virtue of Judaism. Luzatto indeed goes further. He says that it is the *whole* of Judaism; and so far as the literary sources go, I have no doubt that he was far nearer the truth than Ahad HaAm.

7

I made mention at an earlier stage of the name of Nahman Krochmal, and this brings me to a far more important general point.

It has not been sufficiently appreciated—if indeed it has been noticed at all—that Ahad HaAm, in so far as he is derivable from any previous Jewish thinker, is to be connected with Nahman Krochmal. A good deal is to be said about Nahman Krochmal's book, the first and most important thing being that it is not a book at all, and that, even if it is, it is not Krochmal's. This is not a paradox but a plain statement of fact. The *Moreh Nebouchei Hazeman* was so named by Zunz who created the volume by putting together some of Kroch-

mal's papers which he found after his death. The result is that we do not know whether what was published in Krochmal's name was meant by him to be published at all, much less whether it was meant by him to be published as a part of the book on the religious philosophy of Judaism which he had planned. We certainly do not know, and have now no means of finding out, whether what was published was published in the form Krochmal himself would have liked it to be published.

There has been some discussion on the question whether Krochmal was a Hegelian; and there is reason for supposing that he was not a Hegelian in the sense of recognizing the existence of no other modern philosopher but Hegel. I should guess myself that he was equally impressed by Kant. But the *Moreh Nebouchei Hazeman* contains as a fact an account of some portion of Hegel's technical logic; and although this may well have been no more than an exercise in translation or vulgarization never meant for publication in this form or in this book, it shows at least that Krochmal was strongly interested in Hegel. And of course Krochmal's celebrated analysis of Jewish history into the three stages of rise and equilibrium and decline has always been said to be Hegelian, especially by people who have not noticed that it misses the whole point of Hegelianism in at least two vital particulars. The topic where the thinking of Hegel is *in fact* preponderant is in Krochmal's treatment of Spirit (*ruah*) and the Spiritual (*ruhani*). This is only a variant of the Hegelian account of *Geist* with all its unfortunate confusions of the human and the divine. If you refer to chapter 7 of Krochmal's volume, you will see that this is so. *Geist* is everywhere—in the specific character (or god!) of each one of the peoples of the earth and in the specific character, or god (!), of the people of the Jews; the difference being that, whereas for Hegel the 'absolute' *Geist*—*hebraice, Haruhani hamuhlat*—manifested itself in, and is identical with, the spirit of the *German* people, for Krochmal it manifested itself in, and is identical with, the spirit of the *Jewish* people. Or rather—but it is different to be sure. By an imprecise use of terms, Krochmal keeps on the respectable side of the fence and, verbally at least, remains faithful to transcendence.

Ahad HaAm did not; but readers of the justly admired essay on Moses are so lulled by the essayist's gentle prose that they either omit to notice this or, if they do, omit to notice its significance. And its significance is made even more significant by the fact that it is so fully in accord with the psychological approach in general which *Ahad HaAm* learned from his French masters. The psychological approach looks at things from the point of view of the *consciousness of the observer*. It has no need of, and no use for, the *nature of the observed*. It has indeed no need of an observed at all. It studies the states of the observer. It is in the observer that whatever takes place, takes place. Anything outside the observer, even the very existence of anything outside the observer, is hypothetical and superfluous. Read the essay on Moses carefully. God is always within. He is the God of the heart, not of Sinai. The heart has its own promptings, and

they are its own in every sense. They well up from within, possibly (as we are told so often now) from archetypal sources in the collective, or the racial, or the universal, *unconsciousness*. They create their object (that is, their semblance of an object). They are not called out, not created, *by* an object.

I sometimes fancy that all this is incompatible not only with the God of Sinai but also with the God of religion as such, at least as religion is understood in the West. 'In the beginning God created' is, to my mind, *a significant statement for religion in general*, it is certainly central for any account of Judaism; and an account which ignores it, or by-passes it, or even neglects it, cannot be accepted without rigid and searching examination.

8

So, regretfully, we have to strip Ahad HaAm down. He is not a philosopher; he was not a son of the Yishuv; he was a man of his own, not of our, time; his interpretation of Judaism, and of Jewish ethics, is doubtful. And yet—imitation and assimilation; priest and prophet; Zionism and Jewish culture; a spiritual center; nationalists and the Diaspora, rival tongues (Hebrew and Yiddish); the transvaluation of values—as I quote the very names of the essays selected for translation by Sir Leon Simon we hear all the slogans of our day. They have lasted a long time; but—and here I am at a loss to proceed since I am convinced that a great deal of the hollowness in our spiritual life today is due to the presence in it of so many of these slogans. I had almost said, the haunting of it by so many of these pale shades. Even assuming that they were valid once (and men like the learned and acute Shai Ish Horovitz were not so sure), we do not seem to have observed that they have passed into history and that history itself has passed on.

And we have not observed something more important still. I called your attention to the fact that Ahad HaAm *used* ideas he found ready to his hand in order to enable him to master and systematize the problems of his age and environment. He *used* ideas he *found*. He did not examine them over-minutely first; and he did not worry overmuch if they were—ultimately—not sound and—ultimately—incompatible with one another. And I am under the uncomfortable impression that many of the ideas he used so fruitfully were ultimately unsound and ultimately incompatible with one another. This may not matter in an essay or a newspaper article, read today, forgotten tomorrow. It does matter, it matters very much, it is of central importance, when the sum of such ideas is taken to be a complete and all-embracing and all-inclusive *philosophy*.

9

Is there then nothing left? Have we only an implicit Hegelianism or an explicit psychologism leading to the equation of Judaism with an immanent nationalism; or teachings on the content of Judaism which are open to grave

suspicion and are certainly opposed to views more deeply based in the authentic line of the tradition? Is there anything left to go back to or forward from?

My own reply would be that there are at least two things, one specific and one general.

The *specific* thing is Ahad HaAm's insistence on the overriding character of moral action. In Judaism the moral requirement is supreme. The great sin of today is the 'politicization' of our Judaism, the great need, the 'Judaization' of our politics.

The *general* thing is the necessity for clear thinking on Judaism. Ahad HaAm tried and (I submit) failed. We must try again.

Jewish philosophy, or rather the philosophy of Judaism, must resume its rightful place in Jewish studies. You remember F. H. Bradley's call for a critical study of first principles in general. I should be glad if from this assembly of teachers of Judaism in this country there should issue a call for a critical study of the first principles of Judaism.

My plea is for more philosophy in Jewish studies. But I must guard myself against a misunderstanding. Even the most thorough acquaintance with, and the most scientific knowledge of, (e.g.) the Arabic original of the Khuzari, *will not do*. Philosophy is not philology. It is not history. It is the study of fact in the light of principles, and the study of principles in the light of fact. I think Ahad HaAm would have agreed with me there.