

# A SEMINAR ON SAINTS


*Papers presented at the Second Seminar  
of the Union for the Study of the Great Religions  
(India)*

*With the Opening Address of  
Dr S. RADHAKRISHNAN  
Vice-President of India*

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### III

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## RELIGION AND PIETY IN SPINOZA

LEON ROTH

So far as I have been able to observe<sup>1</sup>, the word Religion occurs in Spinoza's *Ethics* six times only. Of these, it is three times conjoined with 'piety', once with 'true life', once it is used in a conventional and somewhat deprecatory sense; only once is its usage defined. 'To Religion', he says (IV, 37, sch. 1), 'I refer any desire and action of which we are the cause in so far as we have the idea of God or in so far as we know God'. Since in the next sentence we are given a parallel account of the word 'piety' in which it is said to be 'the desire of doing good which is saturated in us from the fact that we live by the rule of reason', it would appear that for Spinoza the distinguishing characteristic of religion is the referring of desires and actions to the 'idea and knowledge of God' as distinct from the 'rule of reason'.

#### 1

It thus becomes clear that, although the *word* religion is so strikingly absent from the *Ethics*, its *substance* occupies its whole content. For it hardly needs pointing out how completely and how intimately the idea of God informs the whole

1. The invitation to deliver a lecture on Spinoza at this conference reached me only on landing at Colombo, and it was written during some extensive travelling in South India. For a sight of the text of Spinoza (in Elwes' translation) I am indebted to the good offices of Professor Nikam in Mysore and Professor Mahadevan in Madras.

work. Its first book is devoted to the exposition and explanation of the idea of God, its fifth the demonstration that it is only in and through the knowledge and love of God that man finds his fulfilment. Thus religion, according to Spinoza's own definition of the word, far from being a negligible or otiose part of his thinking, is, so far at least as man is concerned, its very core and essence; and it is no accident but perhaps the most significant feature of his whole philosophy that the final aim and achievement of man, as laid down in the concluding portion of the *Ethics*, are described in the traditional religious terms of Salvation and Beatitude.

Yet we are not all philosophers, and it would be a poor religion which only philosophers could understand; and it would be a poor outlook for the ordinary man if he had to grasp so difficult a treatise as the *Ethics* in order to learn the path of Salvation. Nor is there need. For (if I may remind you) Spinoza is known to the world not by one book but by two. The first, published anonymously in 1679, is the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*; the *Ethics*, published posthumously in 1677, is the second: and of the two it was the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* which in its own day caused the stir. The fame of the *Ethics* was to come only in the following century. It is true that, on the face of it, the books are very different, the one dealing with the foundations of liberal theology and political thought, the other, after a course of metaphysics, psychology and moral philosophy, with an adventure (apparently) in transcendentalism. Yet first impressions are in this case wrong. The books are indeed different but not so much in their content as in their approach; and not sufficient attention has been paid to the patent biographical fact that it was written at the very time when the *Ethics* was well under way. The preoccupations of both books are the same. For Spinoza, unlike some modern philosophers, had something he urgently wanted to say; and while the *Ethics* is its complete and long-term presentation, the *Tractatus* is (as it were) its interim report. It is the *Ethics*, conceived in reference to the political problems of its own day and



referred to the social and cultural situation of its own day. It is in fact the 'temporal image' of the *Ethics*, and for that very reason deserves, and demands, special study.

## 2

The *Treatise* (as I proposed to call the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* for short) is a typical product of the European XVIIth century is often called the century of Science. But it was also, and no less, the century of culture, of what the trumpeter of the new age, Francis Bacon, called by the significant name of the 'wisdom of the tradition'. Antiquity for the XVIIth century lived on as the source of present wisdom, and not what is now called *classical* antiquity alone. Hebrew and Hebrew literature took their place naturally side by side with Greek and Latin authors. If we understand this, we understand one side of the *Treatise* which startles our illiterate or at least monoglottic generation. For the *Treatise* treats seriously the experience of life embodied in the Hebrew Scriptures; and it draws on it in exactly the same way as it draws on the experience embodied in Greek and Latin literature. Moses as well as Solon, Job as well as Vergil, the Book of Kings as well as Tacitus (particularly Tacitus), are shown as presenting us with digested material for our meditation and instruction. They are used in order to illumine the current situation.

Thus what proved historically to be the grand novelty of Spinoza's *Treatise* follows quite naturally from its literary presuppositions. The *Treatise* take the Hebrew Scriptures as they are. It accepts them on their own terms. Truths, they are to be their own witness, their own expositor. They are to be read and judged by their own light.

We are to forget, then, all external aids and supports; all creeds and supervenient beliefs; all glosses and commentaries and frills. When we do this, many things become clear which were before obscured or given a false profundity. For example, the theological allegorists found in the Hebrew Scrip-

tures the truths of metaphysics. Are they really there? 'Certainly not', says the *Treatise*. But if they are not there, why pretend they are? 'So don't let us pretend', says the *Treatise*. The fact is (Spinoza tells us) that the Bible was not intended as a manual of modern metaphysics. Metaphysics and creeds and articles of belief appertain to philosophy, and philosophy belongs elsewhere. The concern of the Scriptures is not with philosophy but with morals. Look at them without pre-conceptions and you will see that what they require of man is the grand simplicity of right *living*.

'No!' says the theologian, 'the Bible is founded on miracles; and through miracles it teaches the articles of a supernatural faith'. So Spinoza opens the *Treatise* which the famous chapters on prophecy and miracles which set the XVIIth century ablaze.

## 3

Any reader of Spinoza's correspondence, or of Leslie Stephen's *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, or of M. Paul Hazard's recent *Crise de Conscience*, will recognize the nature of the fire they kindled. They earned for their author the dangerous name of atheist; much to his amazement, for he had thought, as he protests repeatedly, that what he had written was in support of all sound religion. But the point at issue is, at any rate to us, clear. It is summed up in the title of a book by one of Spinoza's first serious students: 'Christianity *Not Mysterious*'. For Spinoza religion had, I shall not say no mysteries, but certainly no mystifications. Not that he was lacking in what Paul Claudel has called the Sense of the Unseen. One of the great sayings of the *Ethics* (V 23, sch.) is *Sentimus Experimurque ros aeternos esse*: 'we feel and experience that we are eternal'. The feel of eternity is in our very bones, as it were. It is a fact of experience and as such, as he says here explicitly, we dare not overlook it. And that is Spinoza's general principle everywhere, to be faithful to experience. Only here, in the *Treatise*, the

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experience he is concerned with is that embodied in the Hebrew Scriptures. And the God of the Hebrew Scriptures makes no claim on our logic. He makes his claim on our *conduct*.

And the claim is made in terms which are both direct and simple. Take the prophets. They do not speak (Spinoza tells us) in the intellectual language of concept but in the imaginal language of simile and parable; and they are no more transmitters of eternal truths than they are fore-tellers of the future. They are neither metaphysicians nor physicists; neither soothsayers nor magicians. They are moralists, exhorting to the good. Religion for them requires obedience to the moral code. It is obedience to the moral code.

And so too religion in general. It is not philosophy. It is morals; that is, according to the *Treatise*, right action directed and illumined by the natural light which is the love of God. Like his predecessor Lord Herbert, Spinoza used the old tradition about what was called Natural Religion and specified (cap. xiv) certain doctrines as appertaining to the 'universal faith'; but these are offered not as demonstrated truths of independent philosophical value but rather as the working support of the moral life, 'to be adapted', he says, 'by every one to his own way of thinking and to be interpreted by every one according as he feels that he can give them his fullest and most unhesitating assent, so that he may the more easily obey God with his whole heart'. They are, as it were, a pragmatic prop for the one thing necessary, obedience. For religion is not creed, and opinion, true or false, does not bring or preclude, Salvation. What is of account is not the details of doctrine (on which 'everyone may think as he likes') but moral living. Religion is the 'worship of God, and the worship of God consists only in justice and charity, i.e. kindness to one's fellow-man or love towards one's neighbour'.

Herein lies the differentiation of religion from philosophy to which the same chapter (xiv) leads up and in which it culminates. The end of philosophy is truth; the end of reli-

gion, obedience and piety. Religion therefore 'allows us without blame to think what we like about anything'; and 'the best faith is not necessarily possessed by him who displays the best reasons but by him who displays the best fruits of justice and kindness to his fellow-man'.

## 4

A well-known anecdote puts the matter in a concrete form. Spinoza, we are told, used to encourage his landlady to go to the weekly sermon, which indeed he sometimes attended himself; and when she asked him whether she would be saved in the religion she professed, he replied: 'Yes, provided that, while you apply yourself to piety, you live at the same time a peaceable and quiet life'.

That his view of religion is not incidental but central for the *Treatise* is shown by the clear and precise affirmation of the preface: 'I conclude, in accordance with what has gone before, that everyone should be free to choose for himself the foundations of his creed, and that faith should be judged only by its fruits. Each would then obey God freely with his whole heart, and nothing would be publicly honoured but justice and kindness to one's fellow-man'.

The religion of the *Treatise* is thus, specifically and decisively, completely distinct from philosophy: its concern is not speculative truth but moral action. It is a theistic ethical faith, recalling in many of its characteristic features the 'religion of the future'<sup>2</sup> so much discussed in recent years. It has beliefs but no dogmas; it is for all men alike; it condemns sectarianism and disclaims monopolies; it rejects all miracles except the supreme miracle of a word of miracleless regularity and order; it springs from, and ends in, knowledge and

2. Expressed clearly in some of the papers read recently at the XXXIst Indian Philosophical Congress at Annamalai under the rubric: *Does Indian Philosophy Need Reorientation?* See the published *Proceedings*, and especially, pp. 199-206.

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love, yet its required fruit and outward manifestation is not fine words but good deeds. For religion in this sense, a universal religion of justice and practical love, Spinoza pleads passionately and explicitly. Himself the victim of intolerance and the son of a people victimized by intolerance, he sets out in reasoned terms, possibly for the first time in European history, the rational grounds for a complete and unequivocal tolerance as the root principle of a civilized society.

For we must not overlook the significance of the title of the *Treatise*. It is the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, not the *Tractatus Theologicus* or the *Tractatus Politicus*. It deals neither with theology alone nor with politics alone but with them together; that is, with the place of religion in human society and with the nature of human society as required by religion. And the political side of its conclusions may be put in a nutshell. If the essence of religion is moral living, then society has no right to concern itself with people's opinions. Its concern is with people's *actions*. Its function is to help them to become good men. And good means *good*: right *acting*, not right *thinking*. Men's philosophies are their private affair.

And so and here for the XVIIth, and possibly for the XXth, century too, is Spinoza's central political thesis: Keep metaphysics and catechisms and articles of faith and creeds out of your State constitutions and public concerns. They are not the purpose of the organisation of social life and they are not its business. Social life should be organised such that the maximum of freedom should be given to every single person provided he does no injury to his fellow-men.

And here the argument of the *Treatise* assumes a yet wider sweep and embraces one of the greatest of all social issues. For the severance between philosophy and religion, between the search for truth and the need for morals, is not a matter of theory only. It has an important practical consequence. It precludes the subjection of thought to external control.

For 'freedom' is not physical only. Man is mind as well as body. He must be free to 'think what he likes and to say what he thinks'. If thought is subjected to external control, mind is maimed. It is no longer mind. But if there is no mind, there is no man. There may be animals, brutes, beasts, but no *man*. The control of opinion by Governmental authority means the stifling in man of that by virtue of which alone he is man.

In a final chapter (xx) Spinoza shows, by many sober considerations drawn from history and every-day experience, that to 'make man think in accordance with authority' (or rather, since the control of thought is in fact impossible, to attempt by legislation or Governmental decree to make men think in accordance with authority) is to foster dishonesty and corruption, to ruin the latter element among the citizens, and to poison the very springs of uprightness and good faith both in public and private life. But the argument need not be pursued in the pages of the *Treatise*. We can follow it practically in the history of our own time. Yet it is worth insisting on its terms for which we need not go beyond the *Treatise's* title-page. 'In it' [the *Treatise*,] we read, 'it is shown that liberty of thought and its expression is not only compatible with piety and the public peace; but that piety and public peace are endangered if liberty of thought and expression be withheld'. Liberty of thought and expression is in fact not a negative but a positive condition of the community's well-being. Not only are we, both collectively and individually, doomed without it. It must be maintained if our lives are to be worth living at all. It is in fact not a concession to human weakness but a necessity for human health and strength.

## 5

As I have hinted already, the *form* of the *Treatise* is pure XVIIth century, and to study it requires patience and learning and indulgence from the reader of today, a patience and indulgence which few care to give, a learning which few possess.

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And yet I know no argument which is more living and more urgent. On fresh appraisal, indeed, it seems more living and urgent now than ever before. Do we not need to be told, and to tell, today more than ever before that 'the object of Government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts and puppets but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security and to employ their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, anger or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and injustice. The true aim of Government in fact is liberty' (cap xx).

The *content* of the *Treatise* is thus burningly alive. And yet for the student of Spinoza it offers a puzzle. It tells us that religion is a matter of moral obedience, not of metaphysical doctrine, and that philosophy and religion are distinct and different. Yet Spinoza's major work, the *Ethics*, is generally considered the classic expression of the opposite view that religion and philosophy are one, and that it is knowledge which brings Salvation and Beatitude. The *Ethics*, with its culminating vision of man's grasp of eternity through *philosophy*, seems to negate and deny the doctrine of the *Treatise* that religion means simply obedience to the moral code.

### 6

It is interesting to observe that this difficulty was felt by Spinoza's own friends, the editors of the Posthumous Works, and is specially noted in their Introduction. But we have not only a theoretical problem of Spinozistic scholarship but a general problem which arises in practice everywhere and at all times. A recent expression of it in England is the revival over the B.B.C. of the old controversies surrounding the conception of a Humanist Ethics; or in India, the essay of Sri C. Rajagopalachari reprinted in the current Bhavans Journal (16-xii-56) and his recent convocation and other addresses as reported in the press. For a Humanist Ethics would seem to be exactly what Spinoza calls Piety. It is the reference of desire and action to the rule of reason alone.

But if what matters is the act, why should we go beyond reason? Have we any need (we are asked) of God? Since right action is in accordance with the rule of reason, and since the rule of reason is within ourselves, Humanism (we are told) is the sole, and a sufficient, basis for morality.

From the point of view of Spinoza's text we may put the question thus. The *Ethics*, as we all know, has *five* books; but is not the fifth book superfluous? Book IV tells us what as men, indeed, what as instructed and enlightened men, we should do. It lays down the path of rational conduct. It holds before us the ideal of the good life in the shape of the life of the *homo liber* (the free man), the man who by use of reason has thrown off the shackles of the emotions in so far as they can be thrown off and become, as far as man can become, free; or, to use the words, and from the point of view, of the *Treatise*, the man whom government has made free. He is free to use his reason. He thinks out his way, his own way, the way of all free men, and he follows it without swerving. His life is rational, the life not of a beast or a puppet, but of a man. He is set within his own confines, he stands four-square on his own feet; he is secure within his humanity.

But *is humanity only human?* There, I fancy, is the rub; and that is why the *Ethics* cannot stop at Book IV. We are part of a larger whole. God or nature encompasses us, living in us as we live in it. *Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse*: in and through our own inadequacy and imperfection we feel and experience that we are something more than this particular body and soul in this particular point of time and place in this particular environment and attendant circumstance. We are not isolated particulars. We move inevitably beyond ourselves. We reach out necessarily to our own completion. The activity of thought, which is the highest activity within us, has the idea of God as its natural consummation. The idea of God is thus its aim and fulfilment, an aim which slowly and progressively comes into our fuller con-



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sciousness, a fulfilment which is our beatitude and salvation. 'It is not by accident but it arises from the *very nature of reason* that the highest good of man is common to all.... Man *could not be or be conceived* if he did not have the power of rejoicing in this highest good. For it pertains to the *essence of the human mind* to have an adequate [not, of course, a *complete*, but so far as it goes an adequate] knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God'. (IV, 35, Sch.)

### 7

And so when we ask what need have we for a further basis for morality, it all depend on what we mean by 'we', and on what we mean by 'need'. 'We' ordinary men 'need' no *basis* for moral action. Our duty is to be moral. Obedience is the one thing necessary. We should learn (and teach) what is required of us; and that is, in the words of the Hebrew prophet, to 'do justice and to love kindness and to walk before God without pride'. We need not refer every action and desire to the idea of God because, again to speak in the language of the Hebrew Scriptures, the rule of right action is declared for us, simply and unequivocally, in the 'declared will' of God. We have only to follow it in our everyday lives and need no metaphysical enquiry into its nature and source. Metaphysics is not for us. Our articles of belief, if we have them, may be as imprecise as we like, and we may treat them as suits us, each in his own way.

As we advance in understanding, however, it becomes clear that the 'declared will' of God is the rule of reason. What was imposed on us as a duty is now seen to be a requirement arising from the rational grasp of the situation. Yet the action remains the same however much the actor may have changed. Moral action is the same for all. And that is why for the *Treatise* morals is treated as a matter of obedience. The *Treatise* is an enquiry into the desirable organisation of society.

## LEON ROTH

But just as imposed habit yields to the recognition of law, so the recognition of law too points beyond itself. May I remind you of the well-known doctrine of the grades of knowledge shared by Spinoza with Plato and, with Spinoza, by Hegel? like Spinoza, we may offer an example from elementary arithmetic and how we stand in regard to such a simple rule as the so-called rule of three. I may be no mathematician but for the purposes of ordinary life I cannot do without it. And yet I know it only empirically and I use it only fumblingly, without skill and without comprehension. I am liable to stumble in it or indeed to fall. At its best it is for me a *rule*, something imposed meaninglessly from without.

But for my mathematical friend with his knowledge of the network of numbers the rule of three is not a *rule*. It is not an imposed order coming to him from without. It is what it is and cannot be otherwise. It cannot be changed or be other than it is because number is such as it is.

And there is a higher grasp still. All rules within number, and the nature of number as such, are what they are because the totality of things is what it is. Number itself is only one manifestation of a universal creativity embodying itself in an ordered whole. For the highest intelligence every rule and every order and every sequence is only an individual expression of the whole.

But there are in truth no *rules*, no laws. As the French proverb puts it: *Il n'y a pas de maladies; il y a seulement de malades* (there are no illnesses—only ill people). 'Rules' and 'laws' are only our verbal classifications and generalizations of the behaviour of individual things. The highest law is thus that there are no laws, only individual centers of activity acting in accordance with the nature of their own being.

This, I suppose, is what Spinoza means when he says (V 24), in the phrase which was so to strike Goethe, that the more the mind advances, the more it knows individual

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things (*res singulares*). The more it knows individual things, the more clearly it functions and the more it knows the nature of God; and the more it knows the nature of God, the more it knows individual things and the more it becomes itself. But the individual thing is not an isolated particular. It is the individualised manifestation of God or nature, the one nature of all things together.

This, obscurely or clearly, we *feel*. 'We feel and experience that we are eternal'; and the 'urge' (*conatus*) of our minds (Eth. V 25), which is part of the universal 'urge' (*conatus*) of all things (Eth. III 7-9), brings this feeling into active consciousness and clearer knowledge as our mind becomes more fully free and active, more fully 'conscious of itself and of God and of things'.

### 8

Thus Humanism — or should we say the political view? — is not enough for the reason that it necessarily reaches out beyond itself. And yet, within the confines of society and social thought, its prescriptions *are* enough. Society, which rests on acts done and not on the actor's reasons for his actions, *can* remain within the confines of man.

Yet even that statement is not accurate since actions — *future* actions — *do* depend on the actor. Society cannot ignore religion. Yet the religion it requires should not be credal. To impose a creed is to cripple the mind. Society is justified in imposing moral rules. But if it imposes metaphysical beliefs in their support, it is closing men's minds and defeating its own ends. The only way out is the way of *Treatise*; and that, as we have been, is to suggest a pragmatic frame-work, and to treat it, and allow the citizen to treat it, pragmatically.

But this is not final truth. For the state, piety — the rule of right reason — is enough. But it is not enough for the individual man. The individual man by his very nature cannot stop there. He must think, must seek to understand. It

appertains to his very essence to have an adequate, however incomplete, knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Thus the structure and compass of the Ethics is justified. The first book treats of God; the second of nature; the third of man as a part of nature; the fourth of the proper behaviour of man when the fact that he is a part of nature is taken into account. But to be a part of nature is to be a part of God; and the fifth book brings us to the recognition of man's recognition of this fact and binds the content of the preceding books together.

For the way of right living and the way of right feeling and the way of right thinking are finally and ultimately one and the same. Its practical side is the familiar one of detachment. But it is detachment of a special kind. It is detachment through attachment, attachment to the eternal and infinite object which can never alter and never disappoint, and which can arouse an emotion strong enough to overpower all other emotions.

Emotional life remains the final truth of man: desire cannot be extinguished. But it can be diverted. Its object can be changed. Its 'proper' object can be found. We do not rejoice in doing good because we have restrained our desires. On the contrary, we are enabled to restrain our desires because we rejoice in doing good. (V 42).

## 9

Spinoza's philosophy is thus the account of his discovery of the infinite and eternal; but he could not have set out on the quest if he had not, in some fashion, already known its end. "Thou couldst not find me if thou hadst not known me'.

This pre-figuration or pre-vision or pre-adumbration of the end is the root of Religion. We are men, not stones. We *start* with the sense of eternity; but the sense of *eternity* is not the *knowledge* of eternity, certainly not its full conscious-

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ness and realisation. It is a *nisus*, a striving, a grouping, which exists in us owing to the facts of our, and of universal, nature. It is only slowly and painfully — ‘painfully’ in the sense of difficulty, not in that of pain, for like every exercise of function the process of spiritual growth is accomplished by joy — it is only slowly and with difficulty that we and our minds and our worlds attain the clarity of the real. But the beginnings are in us from the start. The development is of an existing seed. ‘*We feel and experience* [an experience which contains within it the seed of knowledge]—*that we are eternal*’. ‘It is no accident but arises out of the very nature of reason that man’s highest good [the eternal and infinite reality] should be common to all. . . . For it appertains to the *very essence* of the human mind to have an adequate knowledge [however fragmentary and incomplete] of the eternal and infinite essence of God’.

### 10

I have suggested that, just as for the reader of Spinoza’s *Treatise*, the *Ethics* is a necessary supplementation, so for the reader of the *Ethics* the fifth book is an essential completion of the road inaugurated by the first. But those for whom the conclusions of the fifth book are no novelty should remark that between the first and the fifth books of the *Ethics* there are the second, the third and the fourth. The fourth, I should say, is in the tone very akin to the thought of the stoics which is very akin to the thought of the Buddha, and this too will not be strange to my present audience: You will know it from many authentic texts. What is peculiar to Spinoza is thus Books II and III, the account of the world we know and of the nature of our human make-up. It is the *concrete detail* of its physical, psychological and moral doctrine, a doctrine held fast within the closely-knit metaphysical frame-work, which makes the *Ethics* so uniquely instructive. The metaphysics *lives in* the psychology and morals; *there*, I think, is the secret, and there the special value to us, of Spinoza. The pure intellectual enterprise of metaphysical speculation is apt

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to sink into an empty and monotonous verbalism unless it harks back to, and is verifiable in, our everyday life and thought and feeling and action.

And for the same reason the piety of the *Treatise* should not be overlooked. It is not exalted as is the Religion of the *Ethics*. It does not respond to, or correspond with, the higher flights of the soul. It is temperate, practical, restrained; a social necessity rather than a metaphysical truth.

Yet for all that — I suggest to you — it is essential; a preliminary, if you will, but an *essential* preliminary. And do not despise preliminaries. They are the solid ground, the run-way (as they call it on the air-fields) without which the higher flight cannot be undertaken, and to which all flights must return.

APPENDIX

UNION FOR THE STUDY OF THE GREAT RELIGIONS

Second Seminar and Conference

December, 26 — 30, 1956

At Vivekananda College, Mylapore, Madras-4

PROGRAMME

FIRST DAY

*Wednesday, 26th December, 1956*

8-30 a.m. Inauguration :

1. Invocation
2. Reading of Messages
3. Address by *Dr S. Radhakrishnan*, Vice-President of India
4. Vote of Thanks

10-30 a.m. Get-together of the Delegates :

Informal talk by Professor *P. N. Srinivasachari*,  
Retd. Principal, Pachaiyappa's College

2-30 p.m. Talk on 'Saintliness and Brotherhood' by *Dr. William A. Shimer*, Executive Secretary, World Brotherhood, Asia-Pacific Division, Hawaii

3-30 p.m. Group Meetings :

- A. Mysticism and Metaphysics :  
Leader — *Dr J. N. Chubb*, Bombay
- B. Mysticism and Ethics :  
Leader — *Prof. N. A. Nikam*, Mysore

C. Mysticism and the Modern World :

Leader — *Dr A. S. Narayana Pillai*, Trivandrum

5 p.m. Group-photograph of Delegates  
Tea by the Reception Committee

6 p.m. Public Lecture on "The Object of Our Efforts" by  
*Mr K. D. D. Henderson*, Secretary, Co-ordinat-  
ing Committee, USGR, Oxford

The Hon'ble *Sri M. Bhaktavatsalam* presides

SECOND DAY

*Thursday, 27th December, 1956*

9—10-30 a.m. Talks on Saints

11 a.m. — 12-30 p.m. Talks on Saints

2-30 p.m. Group Meetings

6 p.m. Public Lecture on 'The Significance of Religion for  
the Modern Man' by *Dr C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar*

The Hon'ble *Sri C. Subramaniam* presides

THIRD DAY

*Friday, 28th December, 1956*

9 — 10-30 a.m. Talks on Saints

11 a.m. — 12-30 p.m. Talks on Saints

2-30 p.m. Group Meetings

6 p.m. Public Lecture on 'Spinoza' by *Dr Leon Roth, F.B.A.*,  
England

*Prof. N. A. Nikam* presides

FOURTH DAY

*Saturday, 29th December, 1956*

9 — 10-30 a.m. Talks on Saints

11 a.m. — 12-30 p.m. Talks on Saints

2-30 p.m. Group Meetings